From a total of $ 1.8 trillion
in 2000, global foreign exchange reserves reached a peak of $ 12 trillion by
mid-2014. China alone stockpiled reserves from $ 170 billion in 2000 to $ 4
trillion in August 2014, in order to contain appreciation pressures. High oil
and metal prices, a result of China´s rapid industrialization and urbanization,
funded not only the build-up of FX reserves mostly invested in US Treasury
bills but also fueled real assets recycled into world equities, property, and collectibles.
So oil-loaded sovereign wealth funds
(SWFs) became an alternative to merely accumulating official foreign exchange
reserves, with the explicit mandate
to invest “excess” reserves in higher-yielding assets (Reisen, 2008)[1]. Surging exports and oil prices produced a
significant shift in the world’s net wealth in favour of those emerging economies
running surpluses; mostly held by governments, assets were also de-privatised. In
2008, I had dubbed this process ´Shifting Wealth´, a term still popular at the
OECD (OECD, 2010)[2].
´Shifting Wealth´ is going into
reverse these days. Since mid-2014, both emerging economies´ FX reserves and
SWF assets have dropped a result of lower commodity prices and lower gross
capital inflows. The slowdown and rebalancing in China and tumbling commodity
prices have started to produce a gradual melting of foreign assets being held
by the world´s nouveaux riches. China´s
FX reserves a now down by $ 800 bn to $3.2 trn, still the world´s largest.
Saudi FX reserves have tumbled from $ 2.8 trn to $ 2.3 trn, Russia´s from $ 0.6
trn to $ 0.37 trn. From their peak reached in mid-2014, these three countries alone
have lowered FX reserves by $1.5 trn. While everybody worries about a US Fed in
tightening mode, it is largely ignored that the shrinking balance sheets of
emerging economies´ central banks have tightened global liquidity considerably,
especially since mid-2015.
Since then, the broader markets
for risk assets have stalled and are nowadays tumbling. The FT cites asset managers who find that “Sovereign
wealth funds drive turbulent trading”, to explain sharply lower stock
markets since early 2016: “We know that sovereign wealth funds are under
pressure to sell and that is contributing to the market pressure we are seeing”.
And “Sovereign wealth funds have become forced sellers”. These statements are
in strong contrast to those who have hailed SWFs as ideal long-term investors
for infrastructure finance or development banks, not least for their long-term
liabilities. SWFs as forced sellers were not conceived to happen. In a 2008
speech, the World Bank president, Robert Zoellick, had called on SWFs from the
Middle East and Asia to invest 1 percent of their assets in Africa.
Table 1: SWF assets, end 2014 v end 2015, $bn
SWF
|
2014
|
2015
|
Change
|
China*
|
1,861
|
1,948
|
+87
|
UAE**
|
933
|
1,066
|
+133
|
Norway
|
893
|
824
|
-69
|
Saudi
|
757
|
632
|
-125
|
Kuwait
|
548
|
592
|
+44
|
Singapore***
|
497
|
538
|
+41
|
Qatar
|
256
|
256
|
0
|
* China
Investment Corporation, SAFE, HK Monetary Authority, National Social Security
Fund
** Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority, Investment Corporation Dubai, Abu Dhabi Investment
Council
*** Gov´t of
Singapore Investment Corporation, Temasek
Source: swfinstitute.org
Table 1 tries to shed
some light on the obscure world of SWFs. Except for Saudi Arabia and Norway, there is little
evidence for melting SWF assets until end 2015. This finding may be due to
incomplete records, dollar movements and hide developments up to and since
mid-2015 as only year-end data are available. And the table doesn´t reveal
whether SWs have already withdrawn from equities and driven up their cash in
the wake of higher risk aversion and tightening global liquidity. Although it
seems to confirm the stability of SWF assets despite commodity headwinds, Table
1 hides a big warning for holders of risk assets worldwide: You ain´t seen
nothing yet!
Table 2: Fiscal breakeven Brent prices,
$/barrel
Country
|
2014 (avg $/b 99.9)
|
2015 (avg $/b 53.6)
|
2016 (avg. $/b 42.5)
|
UAE
|
80.5
|
69.4
|
62.3
|
Saudi
|
107.0
|
100.4
|
77.6
|
Kuwait
|
51.2
|
49.3
|
47.2
|
Qatar
|
43.9
|
49.3
|
54.9
|
Memo: Nigeria
|
124.7
|
88.9
|
85.4
|
Source: Deutsche Bank Research, Updating
fiscal breakevens for EM oil producers, 29 January 2016
Oil dependent
governments may start to raid their SWFs to prop up their economies and
political survival as tax receipts fall on the back of the fall in the price of
oil. An interesting analysis by Deutsche Bank has calculated the fiscal
breakeven points for various oil-producing countries. It shows that fiscal
adjustments have happened and are expected for the future in those countries.
But the fiscal adjustment is just too painful and limited to stem the fiscal
breakeven Brent price above the estimated brent price/barrel. Note that the
current Brent price hovers around $30/barrel and is thus far below the price
that Deutsche Bank estimate for the average of 2016. So beware of those “anti-cyclical”
“long-term” investors, the oil-loaded SWFs.
[1] Reisen, H.
(2008), „How
to spend it: sovereign wealth funds and the wealth of nations”, Voxeu, 05
June 2008.
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