After the
UK decision to join AIIB in March 2015, an avalanche of Western and Asian
countries recently filed application to join the AIIB. China´s magnetic
attraction and the isolation of the US and Japan became palpable in fast
motion. Representatives from 21 Asian countries had signed the Memorandum of
Understanding on Establishing Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) on 24
October, 2014 in Beijing. By end March 2015, more than fifty countries –two third
Asian, one third non-regional - had filed application to join as founding
members of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Its
subscribed capital is US $ 50 billion, half of which is paid in by China.
Like the
NDB (better known as ´BRICS Bank´ and, compared to AIIB, advancing in slow
motion), the authorized capital for the AIIB is US $ 100 billion, the paid-up
capital US $ 10 billion. The NDB has been established with a global remit to
lend to developing countries. The AIIB is focused on Asia. Both new institutions are intended to
concentrate on funding infrastructure projects. One of the major barriers to
economic development in low and middle income developing countries is the lack
of critical infrastructure such as ports, railways, roads and power.
Although AIIB
and NDB were launched in 2014, the decisions to create them reflect the growing
discontent for many years amongst developing nations that the governance
structure of the IMF and World Bank has not evolved to reflect the increasing
weight of emerging markets in global GDP. AIIB and NDB can be viewed as part of
a concerted Chinese attempt to build a Sinocentric global financial system, as
an alternative to US hegemony, as voice reform in the established IFIs has
failed. At the APEC Leaders’ Summit in November 2014, China´s President Xi also
announced the creation of a new Silk Road Fund to improve connectivity in Asia,
for which China will provide USD 40 billion of capital funding. The BRICS also
had suggested in July 2014 an IMF-style contingent reserve facility
(“Contingent Reserve Arrangement”), for which the five countries agreed to
earmark $100 billion of their foreign-exchange reserves for swap lines on which
all members are entitled to draw. The China-Africa Development Fund and the
China-CELAC infrastructure fund are further examples of recent attempts to
develop a global Sino-centric finance infrastructure.
Table 1: Loan-Equity*
Ratios at AAA-rated MDBs, latest
MDB
|
ADB
|
AfDB
|
IADB
|
IBRD
|
3.6
|
2.1
|
3.0
|
3.9
|
Source: Various press releases and
annual reports (assessed on 30 March 2015 at the MDB websites).
*Equity is defined as the sum of
paid-up capital and reserves.
The AIIB is
likely to eventually dwarf the ADB in terms of loan portfolio (and annual
lending). The level of leverage (loan to equity ratio, the reverse of usable
capital to loan ratio)) depends on the risk bearing capacity of a multilateral
development bank (MDB). MDBs forgo such leverage opportunity if they transfer
amounts to trust funds (such as IDA), which do not use a capital base to
mobilize resources from financial markets and pass the amounts received from
donors to beneficiaries at a rate of 1:1. A very simplified MDB balance sheet
has the loan stock on the asset side and paid-up capital plus borrowings on the
liability side. A trust fund (or concessional window) with no borrowings can
thus achieve a loan-equity ratio of one only. Borrowings at the level of equity
enable a loan-equity ratio of two, borrowings double the size of equity push
the loan-equity leverage ratio to three. AAA-rated MDBs in 2014 recorded a loan
stock-usable capital ratio of between 2 and 4 (Table 1). Usable capital of one
US dollar, defined as paid-up capital plus reserves, thus could underpin a loan
stock portfolio of USD 2 to 4 at the four leading AAA-rated MDBs.
The AIIB
can be expected to obtain AAA rating by the leading rating agencies. Apart from
strong support by the major shareholder China, the recent joining by
highly-rated non-regional countries (including G7 countries) will lay the
foundations of high intrinsic financial strength. Compared to the AAA-rated
African Development Bank (AfDB), the AIIB will likely be less burdened by
credit-negative considerations than the AfDB, which is burdened by a challenging
operating environment across Africa. The regional exposure to Asia and the
sectoral exposure to infrastructure should confer the AIIB a loan portfolio
with relatively strong credit quality.
Table 2: Paid-up Capital and Total Loan Stock, US$ billion
MDB
|
Paid-up Capital
|
Loan Portfolio
|
Loan-Capital Ratio
|
ADB
|
5.9
|
75
|
12.7
|
IBRD
|
14.0
|
152
|
10.9
|
AIIB
|
10.0
|
(127)
|
(12.7)
|
Source: Various press Releases (assessed on 30 March 2015 at the MDB websites).
Table 2 compares
the paid-up capital of the ADB and the AIIB as well as actual and prospective
loan portfolios. Recent data show paid-up capital to stand at US$ 5.9 billion
for the ADB, backing a total loan portfolio (outstanding plus undisbursed) of
US$ 75 billion. (The respective numbers for the IBRD are paid-up capital of US$
14 billion that underlies a total loan stock of US$ 152 billion.) If AIIB
succeeds in building reserves from retained earnings and other sources, it
could eventually reach a similar loan-(paid-up) capital ratio as ADB (12.7) and
IBRD (10.9). Applying the ADB leverage ratio to AIIB, their paid-up capital
(US$ 10 billion) could end up underpinning a loan portfolio of US$ 127 billion
(AIIB). Applying the smaller IBRD leverage, the AIIB loan portfolio would still
reach US$ 109 billion eventually, absent (negative) substitution or (positive)
agglomeration effects respectively. While it is much too early today to be
confident whether the newcomer will reach the financial performance achieved by
ADB and IBRD, the scenario laid out here might well suggest that AIIB will end
up with a higher loan portfolio than at present ADB. Consequently, expect the
China led development bank to have a leading impact on multilateral development
lending in Asia, hence on global financial governance.