The
Brazil of the 2000s has been a much-admired country until recently. The country
was hailed as a role model of pro-poor growth[1]
as the incomes of the country´s poorest percentiles improved much faster than
those of the richer percentiles. Brazil´s conditional cash transfer policy (Bolsa Familia Programme) was widely
advertised as a home-grown policy innovation; that policy should be applied
elsewhere, to the advanced countries as well, thus changing the usual direction
of North-South policy lessons.
Brazil,
after Turkey, South Africa and to an extent China now all witness the clashes
between a vocal but fragile middle class and authorities that portray
themselves as serving first and foremost the needs of those left behind. All the
greater is the embarrassment of many academics and commentators who hailed
Brazil as a social (democratic) model, while concurrent demonstrators in Turkey
were rightly and loudly supported as PM Erdogan responded brutally.
The
protests that had started on 6th June over a 20 centavo rise of public bus
fares in Sao Paulo have now grown into massive and widespread street
demonstrations throughout Brazil´s major cities. Coinciding with the start
of the Confederations Cup – a soccer World Cup test event for 2014 – the
rallies brought together a wide coalition of people frustrated with the escalating
costs and persistently poor quality of public services, lavish investment on
international sporting events, low standards of public healthcare and
education. There is wide unease about inequality and corruption, made even bitter by
the apparent unaccountability of corrupt politicians.
Why now? Why Brazil? I have inquired a bit with Brazilians and experts on Brazil[2] on the economic and social background to the unrest. It appears likely that some features of
popular and populist policy are to blame:
·
The
public sector offers too little value
(quality public goods) for money (with tax ratio at 36% the highest tax
burden outside the OECD world). Lack of domestic security in the presence of
ubiquitous crime; heavy congestion intra cities and lousy transport
infrastructure; deficient public health systems with long waiting lists; bad
education achievements in public schools, reinforcing segmentation along class
and race lines; an unsustainable pension system unable to cope with Brazil´s
ageing population, with a pension replacement rate at 97% (OECD avg 67%), due
to a guarantee to pay pensions at least at minimum wages. As rent-seeking in
the public sector seems pervasive, with many institutions working as employer
of last resort (for family members) and corruption cases multiplying with apparently
unaccountable politicians, the low public sector efficiency has made people
increasingly angry.
·
Industrial policy dirigism, especially since the Dilma
government, has gone along with a decline in industrial production. While
National Champions, big conglomerates, are both pampered and heavily regulated, industry
competitiveness in general suffers from high input cost. Lack of finance and
of market contestability burden smaller firms. Brazil has become a leading trade
protectionist, according to recent WTO data, with average tariff levels at 12%
of imports. High taxes, a complex and fragmented tax system and a strong
regulatory environment restrain Brazil’s economic potential and curb incentives
to invest. In the World Bank’s Doing Business Ranking, which compares the ease
of doing business in 183 countries of the world, Brazil is ranked only 126.
Extremely high real interest rates further impede investment by limiting credit
access for small and medium-sized companies with no access to risk-averse public
(BNDES) or foreign finance. Close connection to government, rather than
corporate prospects and productivity, seem to guide credit allocation and hence
capital misallocation.
·
Inflation is rising, running close to 7% now for
consumer prices (although massaged down); it hits especially the poor and the
lower middle class as stagnant incomes are hit by higher food prices. While the
rise of food prices has exogenous causes (such bad harvests in Brazil and the
US), there is a structural reason connected to expansive public bank lending
that has spilled into consumption and wages at high employment levels.
It seems
that the goodwill that the Henrique Cardoso government built 1999-2003 in terms
of macroeconomic stabilization, fiscal responsibility and transparency has been
used up. Lula was good at distributing the fruits planted by his predecessor;
Dilma seems to be destroying them. Although she was quick to condone the
protesters (unlike Erdogan in Turkey), military police was brutal in Brazil as
well. To be sure, talk is cheap. Eliana Cardoso summarized her views on the current
political system on her widely flowed Facebook page as such: " Politicians
and political parties have failed to understand how explosive the situation is,
because they are guided only by the mechanical maintenance of the spaces of
power that they distribute among themselves and, thus, they forgot to feel the
social climate of the streets and the initiatives of new emerging groups in
virtual networks. It looks as if politicians are now unable to understand and
represent the demands of the citizens. Very difficult to say what comes
next."
[1] OECD (2011),
Perspectives on Global Development 2012 – Social Cohesion in a Shifting World.
The same report pointed already quite clearly to the limits of policy
interventions targeted to the extreme poor and to the vulnerability of the
lower middle income strata.
[2] My special
thanks, without implicating them, go to Prof. Eliana Cardoso (former Deputy
Economic Minister under the Henrique Cardoso administration), Dr. Julia von
Maltzahn Pacheco (Getulio Vargas U., Sao Paulo) and Jens Arnold (OECD).
Great minds... ?
ReplyDelete:-)))
http://theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=10037
Guy
Guy, many thanks for posting your great article that just appeared in The Globalist, sharing quite similar views. Here is the correct Hyperlink to your article
ReplyDeletehttp://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=10037
Helmut