Tuesday, 10 July 2012

Global Trade Patterns

Global trade has both induced and reflected Shifting Wealth in many ways. Gordon Hanson (2012) in his NBER paper “The Rise of Middle Kingdoms: Emerging Economies in Global Trade”  has recently closely examined changes in international trade associated with the integration and rise of low- and middle-income countries, for the period 1994 – 2008 when the share of developing economies in global trade more than doubled. Two properties of global trade have become apparent over the last two decades:

·         The share of trade in GDP has grown sharply for low- and middle-income countries as growth in trade advanced even more rapidly than their relative economic size; exports over GDP rose from a quarter to more than half of non-OECD GDP during 1994 – 2008.
·         The shifting pattern of global trade has involved much larger South-South (and North-South)  trade flows. Between 1994 and 2008, the South-South component of low-income country exports rose from 22 to 29 percent; the South-South component of middle-income exports rose from 33 to 46 percent during the same period.

To be sure, the growth in Southern trade has been associated with reduced trade and transport cost, WTO membership and unilateral trade reform. An important explanation, according to Hanson (2012), of why South-South commerce has surged over the last decades are expanding multi-stage global production networks. Much of the recent increase in trade appears to be the result of offshoring, with manufacturing fragmented across borders as firms have exploited comparative cost advantages[1].  Apart from falling trade cost and expanding global production networks that are driving global trade, the greater role of emerging countries has induced a much finer degree of international specialisation than occurred previously when North-North trade predominated . Hanson’s (2012) findings emphasise the return of comparative advantage in connection with Shifting Wealth: low income countries have accentuated during the past decades their net exports in three resource or labour intensive sectors – agriculture, raw materials, and apparel and shoes – and their import surpluses in other sectors. Middle income countries have turned into net exporters of electronics, increased (slightly) net exports in the primary sectors, turned into net importers in apparel/shoes and remained so in capital intensive sectors.


Graph 1: Sector Trade Shares, Middle Income Countries


Gordon Hanson (2012), “The Rise of Middle Kingdoms: Emerging Economies in Global Trade”
Foreign direct investment (FDI)  has been a crucial vehicle in building global production chains and has been usually characterised by a predominant North-South direction; indeed, FDI sourced by OECD countries and hosted by developing countries has surged during the 2000s. Like trade, FDI flows have also been growing faster than, hence rising as a fraction of, global GDP. However, while these are by now well documented facts, the rise of outward FDI by emerging countries has been less appreciated. Outflows of FDI as a share of GDP rose over the 1994 to 2008 period from 0.2 to 2.2 percent of GDP in middle income countries, fast approaching ther 3.6 percent of GDP sourced from high-income countries in 2008.



[1] A consequence may be that gross trade flows (i.e., total exports) overstate net exports (corrected for intermediate imports), which might imply that some recent expansion of South-South trade, especially for manufactures,  is merely a statistical artifact.

Thursday, 7 June 2012

Rudi Dornbusch, the Euro and the Latin Triangle

Rudi Dornbusch was born and grew up close to my birthplace in Krefeld, in today’s North-Rhine Westphalia, on 8 June 1942. Precisely 70 years ago, a reason to give this great and generous economist, who died ten years ago,  a memory. There are other reasons for me, more personal. My late aunt knew his mother quite well and always praised her Mutterwitz, if you wonder where his formidable wit and speed of mind might have originated. When Eliana Cardoso visited the OECD Development Centre in Summer 1988, she was accompanied by her husband Rudi who wanted just to have a desk and to circulate freely in Paris, in intellectually more rewarding places. (The invitation of the couple, I am afraid, turned out to be less than the Centre President had hoped for, as they left the place with a deep feeling of disappointment.) Nonetheless,  I had an opportunity to show them my Ph.D. which I had just finished at the tender age of 37, on the “Latin American Transfer Problem”, where I tried to shift the focus to the budgetary problem of public debt, away from the then common view that Latin America suffered mostly from a dollar exchange problem. Dornbusch suggested that I sent a shortened fraft to Peter Kenen, so my Ph.D turned into a Princeton Study in International Finance[1]. I guess they both liked how I used the interwar debate on Germany’s reparation problem to reinterpret the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s.
Dornbusch’s focus on Latin American financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s provides valuable insights for today’s Europe, as highlighted by a  smart blog entry by Ed Dolan, “How the Latin Triangle Swallowed the Euro”,  based on  Dornbusch’s article[2]. In the graph borrowed from Ed Dolan, the vertical axis denotes the real exchange rate, and real wages that is, as in a fixed-currency setting appreciation lowers import cost and raises the consumption wage;  appreciation is upwards. That upward movement of real wages and exchange rates depicts the past period in Southern Europe and in countries with a hard peg to the euro, such as Estonia. The cycle begins at A, with a balanced current account and full employment (well, God bless& fulfill our assumptions!). The Eurozone brings interest convergence, rising real estate prices and rising wages; the economy shifts to B, which denotes an increasingly unsustainable deficit. And then, to quote Rudi Dornbusch, comes the crisis, eventually:
“The crisis takes a much longer time coming than you think, and then it happens much faster than you would have thought, and that’s sort of exactly the Mexican story. It took forever and then it took a night.”
With a sudden stop in external finance, and with the devaluation option off the table, the remaining alternative is a sharp turn toward fiscal austerity. In the short run, that will move the country toward point C, with falling GDP and rising unemployment. If the austerity is sufficiently stringent and kept in place long enough, nominal prices and wages may begin to fall. In principle, such an internal devaluation could move the country down along the line from C toward A. So in the “best” of worlds, with civil servants salaries cut by more than 20% and flexible labour markets, what can be achied is the recovery path of Estonia. Neither is that outlook too appealing, as Krugman has noted by pointing that only half of the slump has been recovered since the peak, nor is all the deflationary hardship to impose politically feasible in all countries. Bruening tried so, we got Hitler.
In recent weeks, when the Eurozone crisis intensified again in that cycle of extreme market stress and public intervention established by now, I have started to wonder what Dornbusch would have said and written. Dornbusch was a Eurosceptic. In “Euro Fantasies: Common Currency as Panacea”  he doubted that a common currency could work in the absence of flexible labour markets. And as a Keynesian (which he had increasingly become as his Chicago years vanished in the haze) he feared the deep recessions that the budget cuts stipulated by the Maastricht criteria would cause. He shared the scepticism with many US economists, which he classified in a way that now looks increasingly clairvoyant: “The euro: It can’t happen. It’s a bad idea. It won’t last.”[3]





 


[1] Helmut Reisen (1989), Public Debt, External Competitiveness and Fiscal Discipline in Developing Countries, Princeton Studies in International Finance No. 66
[2] Dornbusch, Rudiger (2000), "The Latin Triangle," in Keys to Prosperity, MIT Press.
[3] See Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea (2009), “The euro: It can’t happen. It’s a bad idea. It won’t last. US economists on the EMU”, European Economy, Economic Papers # 395, December.


Wednesday, 9 May 2012

Africa’s CFA zone and the Euro zone crisis after the Greek elections

Once again, the Euro zone is in trouble after the Greek elections last Sunday failed to produce a majority government in support of Euro membership and its implications. While Greece may want to leave the Euro zone, the consequences of such exit cannot be confined Greece alone. The BIS data for locational banking statistics on an ultimate risk basis are also now available for the end of 2011, and show consolidated claims on Greece of EUR 90.5bn (136bn a year earlier) for European banks, with France 44bn (56bn a year ago), most exposed. Portuguese banks remain exposed as well, and Spanish banks in turn to Portugal’s banks.  And so on…Greek cross border claims remain high on Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, so dislocation from an impaired Greek banking system would imply sudden stops for these countries. My best bet is, therefore, that Greece will not be allowed to leave – yet.
One reason is that there is widespread “fear of floating” in small open economies. Governments in a typical emerging country can hardly tolerate massive overvaluation or undervaluation of their
 currencies.  Reasons for fear of floating are the devastating balance–sheet effects and the growth disruptive effects of prolonged periods of misalignment.

Whether hard pegs or membership in monetary unions are a better alternative for open economies depends very much on institutional and regulatory prerequisites and on their degree of endogeneity with respect to the exchange–rate regime. Braga, Cohen and Reisen (2001)[i] summarized these requirements as follows:

·         the banking system must be strengthened, so that the central banks’ more limited capacity to provide lender–of–last–resort services does not expose the country to financial instability;
·         the fiscal position needs to be strong so that the absence of the central banks’ ability to absorb new public debt does not end in a funding crisis;
·         commercial and intergovernmental credit lines must have been negotiated to secure liquidity in an investor sentiment crisis;
·         the labour market must be made flexible in order to accommodate asymmetric shocks without higher levels of un(der)development; and
·         the real economy structures should be aligned to ensure that cyclical and monetary conditions coincide with the pegging partner.

This is a long list which is not easily met. And it was certainly not met by Greece, which was clear from the outset. In order to see why one should not take for granted that these conditions will be met (somehow endogenously), the CFA experience could have told a lesson already more than a decade ago. Even when monetary unions survive, they can be harmful to growth when the effective (trade–weighted) exchange rate gets out of line, which can happen to a dollarized Latin America as it has happened to the CFA franc zone in Africa, which had been pegged to the French franc since 1949. When the French franc started to appreciate in the mid–1980s against the dollar, but at the same time a prolonged fall in commodity prices reduced the CFA zone terms of trade, the CFA zone countries recorded low growth relative to the rest of Africa, increased current–account deficits and a build–up of external debt.  Alternative adjustment measures were unable to rectify the imbalances, and 1994 saw the end of the longest peg in memory: a 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA franc against the French franc.

Arguably, the fragility of the Euro zone today gives CFA zone (and French) authorities reason to reconsider the peg of the CFA franc to the Euro[ii]. The Euro peg undoubtedly garners benefits for the CFA (e.g., lower transaction costs in trading with EU countries), but its fate is not intrinsically tied to the euro. In the case of a breakup of the Euro zone, it would be a big policy mistake for CFA countries to return to a French franc peg.


Even with the former significance of the trade relationship between African countries and Europe, the degree of monetary and economic integration was lower than was apparent at first sight. With a high share of exports commodity based, much of African trade was sold on dollar denominated markets. Pegging to the euro made those countries vulnerable to fluctuations of the real exchange rate of the euro to other currencies. The same could be said of the opposite choice in favour of the dollar. Both pegs very much destabilize the real effective exchange rate for African exporters, hence providing a disincentive to invest in nontraditional export activities. Now, with the strong rise of the emerging countries (EPs for Partners) over the past decade, the negative impact on growth of a currency peg to either dollar or euro would be even more felt, as a result of further destabilized effective exchange rates and the wrong growth anchor as the engine is now China. With the inclusion of the renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket of currencies planned for 2014, the CFA zone has a new anchor to peg its currency to, with more stability in prospect.



[i] Braga de Macedo, J., D. Cohen and H. Reisen (2001), Don’t Fix, Don’t Float, OECD: Paris
[ii] Consultancy Africa Intelligence (2012), The Impact of Eurozone crisis on the West African Monetary Union zone, polity.org/za, 20 April.

Friday, 4 May 2012

China’s Global Development Impact: From Initial Entry to Sustained Growth Effects

Time is increasingly ripe to better disentangle the global development impact of SW I from SW II:
·         SW I means Shifting Wealth phase I, the initial opening of China and India to world markets which really became felt from the 1990s – a ‘one-off’ event that integrated 2 bn people or 40% of global labour force in the global market economy;
·         SW II stands for Shifting Wealth phase II, a long-term process of sustained and superior growth in populous emerging countries that keep accumulating skills, capital and modern technology, build a middle-income class, switch from investment-led growth toward more consumption and export increasingly sophisticated stuff and services.
(This post will remain basic and cryptic as I do not want ‘sell’ that brainstorming prematurely).

The commodities-manufactures terms of trade (1949-2008)
                                     Source: Kaplinski (2011)

The graph depicts one aspect of SW1: the initial entry of China into the world markets, especially from when it joined the WTO, has been supportive of raw material prices relative to manufactures, especially manufatures that embody basic skills only. That Stolper-Samuelson effect had led to widespread concerns of China de-industrialising other developing countries, concerns that were confirmed in some semi-industrialised countries such as Mexico, Thailand and South Africa while the majority of low- and middle-icome enjoyed higher growth thanks to China’s growth engine. Are we close to a turning point, from when the terms of trade will start to rise in favour of basic-skill manufactures and to the detriment of high-skill manufactures and commodities? This is what can be gradually expected as China accumulates skills and increasingly starts to export them through goods while the space for low-income supplies starts shrinkings as large emerging markets start to get rich.

China’s Global Development Impact: From Initial Entry to Sustained Growth Effects
Impact Channel
SW I:Entry Effects
SW I Impact on LICs + MICs
SW II: Ongoing Process
SW II Impact on LICs + MICs
Growth Engine
From G7 to China
Higher growth in LIC and MIC,
oil and non-oil
Partial rebalancing of growth engine
Higher trade client diversity, while initial specialisation effects weaken
Agg Demand
Investment-led
Stimulated imports of commodities and skill-intensive
Higher consumption share, less investment
Stimulates low-skill imports, skill imports neutral, structural impact on commodity demand (iron ore, copper suffer; food crop prices stagnant/rising)
Factor Supply
Land-labour ratio lower;
Skills-labour ratio lower
Better ToT for commodities and skill-intensive;
Lower ToT for low-skill manufactures
Skills-labour ratio gradually rising;
Land-labour ratio stagnant
Better ToT for low-skill manufactures with new supply/demand balance;
Skill- and tech-intensive manufactures face lower ToTs.


The shrinking share of investment  in China’s GDP and  the rising middle class in emerging countries will favour goods and services with high income elasticities, such as tourism, cars and green energy. (Engel’s Law tells us that the absolute spending on goods with low income elasticity must not fall, just their share in overall spending). The new demand patterns in turn determine the future price developments of commodities: aluminium and palladium, heavily used in cars and power infrastructure, will fare better than copper, iron ore and zinc, the metals most leveraged to construction and fixed asset investment.
Like raw materials, clusters of countries will be differently affected to the extent that we move from SWI to SWII. Incidentally, Mexico’s economy  grew faster than Brazil’s last year. As the growth differential China-US shrinks, Chinese wage unit cost rise and commodity prices stop rising, Brazil will feel a bit more Chinese headwind, while Mexico will benefit from stronger backwinds.


References
Barclays (2012), “China’s commodity intensity: the dragon’s appetite is changing”, Cross Currents/25 April (not online).
Chamon, M. amd M. Kremer (2009), “Economic transformation, population growth and the long-run world income distribution”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 79, pp.20 – 30.
Damina, B., E. Ianchovichina, and W. Martin (2009), “How will growth in China and India affect the world economy?”, Review of World Economics, Vol. 145, pp. 551 – 571.
Garroway, C, B. Hacibedel, H. Reisen, and E. Turkisch (2011), “The renminbi and poor-country growth”, The World Economy, Vol. 35.3, pp. 273 – 294.
Levy Yeyati, E. (2009), “On emerging markets decoupling and growth convergence”, www,voxeu.org, 7 November.
Conference, 5 - 6 December 2011, University of Bristol.
Wood, A. and J. Mayer, “Has China de-industrialized other developing countries?”, Review of World Economics, Vol. 147, pp.325 - 350.

Tuesday, 24 April 2012

Brics Banks Better

Perhaps nowhere is Shifting Wealth more visible today than in the banking world, according to an excellent article in the twice-weekly (Swiss) Finanz und Wirtschaft. Western banks are still the biggest when measured by the assets they hold on their balance sheets (with Deutsche Bank in the lead). But the ongoing Eurozone crisis has shown that much of the underlying value is shaky and in particular European banks have to deleverage strongly as they are utterly undercapitalised. The OECD’s excellent Adrian Blundell-Wignall does not tire to raise the alarm clocks on the fragile state of OECD commercial banks.
One of the wonderful ironies of contemporary journalism is that the alarm clocks have been belling since decades on the imminent implosion of Chinese banks. Unlike Lehman & Co, that implosion has not materialised; nor are Chinese banks on LTRO lifeblood support, as most European banks are. 

Ranking Banks Market Capitalisation (end 2011)
Rank
Bank
Country
Market cap, bn$
1
ICBC
China
241
2
China Construction Bank
China
196
3
Wells Fargo
US
161
4
HSBC
UK
151
5
Agricultural bank of China
China
142
6
JP Morgan Chase
US
141
7
Bank of China
China
129
8
Itaú Unibanco
Brazil
88
Source: Finanz und Wirtschaft, 7.3.2012

The investors (who have just been burned by Western bank share declines) think that BRIC banks hold more value (see the table for current market capitalisation). Only in 2005, the ranking of top bank market capitalisations held just Western banks. The high market capitalisation of Bric banks compared their assets may be justified, for three reasons: high profit growth, high margins, low default risk. The graph on bank capital returns does indeed suggest that emerging market banks are safer and generate a higher return on equity than do G7-based banks.

Return on Bank Capital

Source: Finanz und Wirtschaft, 7.3.2012

There are plenty of reasons for that. Public debt dynamics are much more favourable in emerging countries than in OECD countries, which translates into lower default risk on bank claims on public entities. The rising middle class generates rising savings, which provide low-cost funding to banks even if financial liberalisation will raise the interest rates on private savings. And emerging market banks are safer and more transparent than many Western banks (Deutsche Bank shares, anyone?) as the share of investment banking is much lower.
A final observation. While Europe and the US had to nationalise banks notwithstanding their ideological priors, emerging-country banks have traditionally been either in public ownership or strongly directed by the public authorities. China’s government is majority owner of China’s four biggest banks, in India two out of four of the biggest banks are public; in Russia, the central bank is the majority owner of big banks such as Sberbank.  The linkage between state and banking is very close in emerging countries, for industrial and other structural policies; that can generate losses, to be sure. But it can support growth, helping a safer asset base, while prudent bank risk management is a necessary collorary to industrial policy.

Monday, 16 April 2012

PBoC sets the RMB free and it ... falls

 People’s Bank of China (PBoC) announced over the weekend that, effective on April 16, 2012, the RMB daily trading band would be widened to ±1% from current 0.5%. That is, the RMB against the USD can be traded in the interbank market within a 1% band around the daily opening fixing price. Meanwhile the allowable maximum daily bid-ask spread for client trades is also widened, from 1% to 2%. This is the first time the PboC has announced a new trading band since May 21, 2007, when PBoC widened the daily trading band from 0.3% to 0.5%.

For many mainstream economists, the US Treasury and for the French Presidential candidates the RMB is strongly undervalued. So there was mainstream welcome to the flexibilisation announced over the weekend. The expectation, to be sure,  was that the Chinese currency would now appreciate faster than it did in the past and hence help improve competitiveness elsewhere.

Widening the RMB daily trading band will help deter “hot money” inflows because it will introduce higher volatility. I think a flexible RMB will make one-way bets more difficult, so that's a good thing, as the currency will find its equilibrium value more easily. I actually reckon that the RMB is now quite close to that equilibrium value, based on our recent estimates (1) and the subsequent real effective appreciation of the RMB.

The RMB displayed greater volatility this morning but steered clear of testing a newly expanded trading band, suggesting investors were comfortable with the current range as Beijing tries to guide the economy through a controlled cooldown. At its weakest point early this morning, the currency traded at 6.3250 per dollar - 0.46 percent weaker than the midpoint and 0.3 percent weaker from Friday's close - just within the previous 0.5 percent limit and well shy of the new 1 percent band that went into effect Monday.

(1) Garroway, C., B. Hacibedel, H. Reisen and E. Turkisch (2012), "The renminbi and poor-country growth", The World Economy, Vo.35.3, pp. 273 - 294, March.

Saturday, 31 March 2012

Goodbye World Bank, Hello BRICS Bank

US President Obama has nominated Jim Yong Kim, an American health expert, to lead the World Bank when (the very able, thoughtful and innovative) Robert Zoellick ends his tenure in July this year. The two other nominees are proven development experts with an outstanding curriculum in terms of proven leadership as ministers and of international organisations: Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Nigeria's finance minister, and Jose Antonio Ocampo, Colombia's former finance minister.

Whatever the merits of Mr Kim, the nomination of yet another US national in times of Shifting Wealth is another proof of Mr. Obama's denial of American decline. That denial will backfire and weaken the World Bank.



Loans Outstanding ($bn), 2010

Source: BBVA Research


With its soft-loan arm IDA, the World Bank is still the most important multilateral lender to poor countries, far ahead of the regional development banks. But the Bank's loan portfolio is not so much bigger any longer compared to that of China Development Bank or BNDES, Brazil's development bank.

The BRICS summit held in New Dehli this weak decided to create a common development bank that would clearly rival the World Bank. The final decision has been withheld this week, probably also to give the US and their Western allies time to rethink Kim's nomination. If the West insists on Kim, the BRICS will go ahead with starting their common development bank. This will intensify the ongoing Balkanisation of multilateral development lending, increase multilateral donor fragmentation and incentivise bilateral development bank lending further.

As pointed out by BBVA Research Emerging Markets in their "Eagles Flash" of 30th March, China is the only BRICS country that has a net external net investment position. It is the world's second largest net creditor, just behind Japan. This would mean that China will contribute the major part of funding to the new BRICS bank. The BRICS bank would help China to extend its influence in the developing world and stimulate demand for its goods and services, without appearing upfront.

It is very likely that the West, notwithstanding all its declamatory governance rethoric and conferences it is becoming infamous for, will not get past its enshrined hypocrisy. Mrs Ngozi Ikonjo-Iweala, who would also be the World Bank's first female President ever (Mrs Clinton: lost your gender zeal here?) is under no illusion: 

“I would really hold the Bretton Woods shareholders to their word, that they want to change the way business is being done and want a merit-based, open and transparent process for the presidency,” Ms Okonjo-Iweala told the Financial Times.
“I just want to see whether people just say things with their mouth that they don’t mean and what’s the level of hypocrisy,” she said in an interview. “So we want to test that.”